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1. Introduction: 
The future of human society is entitled to the fate of environment. We can no longer ignore the 
impact that markets make in our ecosystems and how human necessities are linked to its fate. For 
this is important that we analyse how markets act on these conditions to manage its consequences 
on environment. 
To do so in this paper we will try to answer the question: Is private sector capable to manage 
environmental conservation? Our objective will be to analyse if market mechanisms are able to 
manage their impact on natural environments.  
We will take as cases of study the economic reforms discussed at the conference on “Conservation 
Capital in the Americas” held in January 2009. All of these cases are examples on economic 
interventions, public and private, aiming to finance conservation of environmental resources. 
2. Theoretical approach:  
First of all, we understand environmental management as a result of: efficiency in natural 
resources production, contributing to the conservation and equal distribution of goods. 
Addressing the concept of efficiency, the main theory is illustrated by the concept “Pareto 
efficiency”: it states that efficiency is related to the concept of distribution. If distribution can’t 
be changed in a way that one gains wealth without aggravating the others, then is optimal in terms 
of Pareto. This theory also has two fundamental theorems: first that any competitive economy is 
efficient in Pareto terms, secondly that any allocation, with the help of initial redistribution, can 
accomplish Pareto efficiency by mechanisms of competitive markets. 
We understand competitive markets to be formed by a large number of consumers and producers, 
therefore, none have control over the price or quantity of goods produced so allocations are given 
by competition.  
The situation when market isn’t efficient is called market failure and is the main argument for 
public intervention. Types of market failure are: to start with Imperfect competition on markets, 
such as monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, creates inefficiency in trade and production of 
goods. Secondly, Public Goods that are unlikely to be financed by consumers because of its non-
excludable characteristic, and doesn’t suppose rivalry in consumption because all consumers can 
benefit at the same time. In addition, Externalities are actions that affect third parties in a positive 
or negative way; if a person looks after his garden neighbours enjoy the benefits of view however, 
if the owner decides to cut all trees neighbours will be affected negatively. 
As we have introduced with Public goods, how we finance and enjoy goods affect their 
characteristics: first of all, excludable goods give seller capacity to charge for benefits of 
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consumption. If a person decides to apply a fee to enter his garden, and has the possibility to ban 
not payers, that garden is excludable because use requires payment. On the other hand, rival in 
consumption goods can’t be enjoyed by all consumers. For instance, apple trees produce a limited 
amount of fruit therefore, the consumption of one apple is rival to the consumption of more by 
others. As a result of these characteristics market failure can occur.    
Also, another effect with Public goods is the free rider problem, it consists on consumers 
benefiting of a service but don’t contribute. These effect is generated by the non-excludable 
characteristic of these goods. A good example would be “public parks”: despite everybody is able 
to benefit not all consumers have actually contributed to maintenance or construction. On the 
other hand, free rider problem also occurs when there is overconsumption of shared resources, 
also known as “The tragedy of the Commons”. Common goods such as “fisheries”, are non-
excludable but rival in consumption, therefore, individuals will probably act on self-interest 
instead of regarding the sustainability of their action. For example, not regulated “fisheries” are 
at risk since one fisherman may take a higher catch than others risking the fish stock in the area 
and availability. 
Other type of market failure are: Imperfect access to information due to lack of transparency from 
enterprises and uninformed costumers. Also Incomplete markets situation where some goods are 
not provided by private market even though the cost of producing is less than the cost paid by 
consumers. Finally, Economic perturbations such as unemployment can also suppose market 
failure.  
Even though in some situations public intervention can be effective Ronald Coase suggests that 
private intervention will be effective if: first it granted the existence of property rights, then the 
existence of few actors involved and finally the cost of agreement would be low. As a result of 
these: primarily private actors will create an agreement without public intervention, therefore 
solve the externalities caused by booth parts and internalize the problem. Let’s take as an example 
the pollution of a river by a chemical industry and the negative externality caused to fishermen: 
to start negotiation ownership must be settled, then fishermen can ask for fare share due to their 
loss and in the end if costs are low for booth parts agreement will take place.  
It’s important to notice that all Coase theorem requisites are an extension of transactions costs 
concept. The need for mediation of ownership or existence of too many actors often suppose 
greater costs enabling possibility of agreement, public policies have a preponderant role on 
diminishing these costs and applying initial redistribution. 
In conclusion, efficiency is affected by the existence of market failure. On environmental 
management we’ll mainly work with: Public Goods, externalities and Common Goods. 
Depending on situation public intervention will be useful to achieve efficiency, on the other hand, 
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if Ronald Coase requirements accomplish private action will also be achievable. Our goal consists 
on identifying which, public or private, were used in our cases of study and if it suited the purpose 
intended: efficiency on environmental management.   
3. Cases: 
Tax-related 
- Massachusetts and the community preservation act: “real state transfers” 
Massachusetts was the first State to create public parks, land trust and local land banks in the 
United States. It has a long tradition on environmental conservation, a good example is the 
“community preservation act”: this legislation gives towns and cities the tools to ensure financing 
environmental conservation to preserve natural heritage by intergovernmental partnership. 
The major economic measure by this law was the creation of the “real estate transfer tax” or 
RETT, born on Nantucket Island with the creation of the “Nantucket Islands Land Bank”. This 
tax includes a 2% transfer of each property selling value by these land banks. Mainly it was 
conceived as a way for local governments to find revenue to acquire, hold, and manage 
endangered land. It’s relevant the role of the “trust for public land”, a non-profit conservation 
organization, for the application of these measures and the acquisition of land in order to protect 
it all around United States and especially in Massachusetts.   
The main market failure in this case of study were Common Goods: first of all the lack of unified 
property made that some constructers started diminishing the natural value of the area by building 
properties. Secondly owners acted in self-interest, selling their land without regarding patrimonial 
interest, which endangered their conservation. This also created a negative externality to society 
due to loss of environmental richness.  
There are wide economic effects by these measures: first of all the application of taxes aims to 
equal the private benefits with the social costs related to environmental impact, therefore, finance 
environment conservation and deterrence those who make benefit of illicit construction, also, 
these contributes to lower house prices due to the decrease in offer and the conservation of 
historical and natural patrimony. Secondly it defines property rights for natural resources, if there 
was no defined owner the risk of natural depletion would be greater, also the social demand would 
be unknown. In addition by becoming owner state gets the capacity of excluding users, for 
example by selling tickets or deciding who manages those resources. Finally the “free rider 
problem” is solved by paying taxes, which makes everybody contribute to their impact on natural 
environment and finance it. 
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Under this law everybody was able to enjoy the benefits of these resources and individual motives 
were restrained. There are several reasons why public intervention was used instead of private: 
first of all the asymmetry of information regarding property value made it easier for companies 
to acquire land at a cheaper price than society valued. Secondly the existence of multiple 
ownership’s made impossible unified management of land, which made the number of parties 
involved too numerous to set negotiation. Finally the costs on buying all the land were too 
expensive making the transaction costs unaffordable.  
In conclusion the RETT have: created property recognition, have involved little number of parties 
and has had low transaction costs. Accomplishing those criteria has made environmental 
conservation affordable and reachable to all, has protected property value and has distributed 
resources more efficiently.  
Carbon-related 
- The Kyoto protocol: carbon emissions markets   
The great impact that greenhouse emissions do to our environment and climate are a big threat to 
our economies and lives. It’s important that developed nations accept their responsibility on these 
changes and that developing nations get new mechanisms to grow without spoiling left soils and 
forests which have potential to fight global warming. In the 1990’s the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol were established 
creating mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
Market failure in this case is produced by Public goods, the characteristics of “air” make difficult 
for market to take care and provide this needed resource, also, the contamination of it creates a 
negative externality to society. Furthermore, the needs of developing countries to grow risk the 
fight on climate change effects. 
The most important mechanism to our interests was the European Union emissions trading system 
or ETS. It started in 2005 and established a new commodity market and set trading rules for 
carbon credits to be bought and sold. The main objective was to allow companies to offset a 
portion of their greenhouse emissions by acquiring certified emission reductions (CER) from 
clean development projects on developing countries. 
The main results were: first the creation of a “ceiling” on greenhouse emissions that forced 
companies to acquire licenses for their emissions, as a consequence a thick network appeared 
between companies who would like to reduce or sell their emissions. Furthermore, the existence 
of this new commodity market stimulated companies to develop new productive mechanisms and 
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projects to comply with new requirements and costs. Finally it created new clean development 
mechanisms (CDM) for developing countries to grow and finance natural conservation by selling 
CER’s without implying a growth on greenhouse emissions. 
The existence of these mechanisms gives new visions on the management of public and common 
goods, creates the possibility of solving the externalities caused by contamination giving that 
property rights are defined and establishes private mechanisms which public actors can benefit 
from.  
-  The CHOCO2 project- Ecuador 
One of the most diverse and unique regions of Ecuador is the “Maquipucuna reserve” located at 
the province of Pichincha. The development of the country has putt at risk the healthy 
environment and endangered the conservation of the unique flora of the area. 
The deforestation of historical forests in Ecuador by development throughout civilizations may 
endanger the conservation of native trees. Because healthy and unspoiled forests are Public goods 
is difficult that consumers finance it because their effort won’t benefit them more than the non-
contributors.  
The solution reached to finance the reforestation of the “Maquipucuna reserve” was to apply for 
carbon credits on the global carbon market, by doing so government created a source of finance. 
Private entrepreneurs looking for certified emission reductions could buy those carbon credits at 
market price, giving that creation of carbon dioxide markets creates the opportunity for goods 
affected by non-excludable characteristics to be affordable on market criteria.  
The interesting thing is that there is a strong relation between public and private means: first of 
all, these actions enable public governments, such as Ecuador’s, to set property rights by 
establishing a value on a Public good. Secondly creates an environment on which governments 
and enterprises are able to negotiate in order to finance reforestation while booth gain benefits. 
Finally, these markets make possible a cost of transaction acceptable by both parties. 
In conclusion the CHOCO2 project and the initiative of the global carbon market created by the 
Kyoto project aim to create private solutions to governments. The difficulties that developing 
countries face to protect forests are solved by financing their protection and adding value to these 
public goods in order to be rentable. Government acts as a private individual protecting property 
rights and negotiating to end deforestation caused by development.      
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Limited development-related 
- Tourism on Galapagos islands 
On 2003 the Galapagos Islands had already become a major tourism attraction. The wide variety 
of companies operating on the island and the ecological pressure of its visitors putted on danger 
the sensitive biodiversity of the area.   
On this case of study, the market failure was that biodiversity on the islands (“Common good”) 
was on danger due to the numerous quantity of companies offering services. That made the 
availability of biodiversity endangered because of the irresponsible practices of some sellers.  
The solution reached came from the Rainforest Alliance and Conservación y Desarrollo, two non-
governmental organizations. They created a new certification called “smart voyager” for tour boat 
operators. This certification would enable these companies to communicate their social and 
environmental commitments and would suppose less environmental impact due to requisites of 
appliance.  
The effect caused was that responsible companies were rewarded for doing improvements on their 
activities and biodiversity of the island while irresponsible enterprises were deterrence to act on 
such paradisiac and fragile destinations. 
On this case of study private action took place before public action due to difficulties on public 
mechanisms. Initial redistribution was problematic because the wide existence of several 
companies, in order to solve the problem private actors decided to negotiate to lower their 
transaction costs rather than changing the allocation of goods.  
These measures clarified ownership for companies with regards on natural conservation, limited 
the number of companies operating on the islands and made more affordable improvements on 
equipment and practices because it gives added value to responsible practices.  
4. Conclusions: 
There are several important things to consider to answer the question: Is private sector capable to 
manage environmental conservation? We’ve seen that an equal distribution of goods is crucial to 
manage markets. When redistribution is applied on environmental conservation markets we’ll 
mainly work with Public or Common goods, regards on their characteristics are purposeful to 
decide which redistribution mechanisms should work. If transaction costs on market action are 
low private actors will have opportunities to manage control on these resources, on the other hand, 
if that doesn’t occur public sector should act to lower those costs or manage those markets.  
Measures on taxation prove to redistribute resources in a more optimal way than before its 
application. In the case studied we see that “real state transfers” has made that a “common good”, 
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such as environmental interesting lands, acquire value on market. The tax has made possible that 
private sector redistributes some of the benefits of building to protect the environmental richness 
of these areas. Initial public intervention made possible a more optimal and fare distribution of 
goods and enabled protection of these resources, even though, asymmetry of information in this 
case creates difficulties to value impact on environmental conservation.  
Measures regarding Carbon emissions control have big potential on distributing costs associated 
to Public goods. The creation of carbon emissions markets produces new economic mechanisms, 
such as “ceilings”, that contribute on solving excludability and rivalry of these goods. Otherwise, 
projects financed by “certified emissions reductions” on developing countries suggest new ways 
to finance the protection of remaining forests on these areas. For these projects to work market 
and public sector have to committee to innovative methods that assure low transaction costs 
attached.  
Finally, limited development measures have been practical on reducing impact of human action. 
Negative impact of tourism on “common goods” can be lowered by redistribution mechanisms 
aiming to control market influence. The case of study proves that this redistributive action by 
private sector can regulate costs attached to environment, even though, this measure only 
committee voluntarily making influence less useful than public intervention.   
In conclusion private sector is more than capable to manage environmental conservation when 
costs of transaction are low enough. For this to happen public sector has a principal role on 
applying initial redistribution. Benefits of these policies will depend on the commitment arrived 
by market, some examples studied suggest that redistribution is capable to solve market failure 
occurred because “public” or “common” goods, even though, is hard to decide whether it 
contributes usefully to protect environment or only suppose a new allocation of goods.    
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